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Abstract 
There is a risk in the ‘Smart City’ that plural forms of knowing the city  become eclipsed by 
singular governance-oriented analyses produced through computational logics originating 
from undemocratic service providers. In light of this concern, this chapter considers three 
aspects of smart urbanism’s knowledge politics: i) the role of urban agencies – or 
understanding smart urbanism as a situated, socio-material practice; ii) the agency of smart 
city technologies’ materiality as well as the ownership and control of these technologies, and: 
iii) the political rationalities, values and assumptions embedded in smart city technologies’ 
design and use. Drawing on these insights, this chapter analyses smart knowledge politics in 
Barcelona, where the 2015 Council elections replaced a market-oriented political leadership 
enthusiastically implementing the Smart City with a political leadership whose origins in social 
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movements and citizen democracy made it deeply sceptical towards smart urbanism. We 
analyse how this opened up space for different approaches to using technology in the city 
while at the same time giving rise to materially very different kinds of smart knowledge 
configuring technologies emphasizing citizen participation and democratic control of 
knowledge production. Indeed, political rationalities and smart knowledge configuring 
technologies intersected and co-evolved, rather than one informing the other 
unidirectionally.  
 
 
START OF THE CHAPTER 
 
“Everything flows through the data centre in the middle of the town. So, if I own that data 
centre, I’ve got everything. Literally every part of the town comes right through there ... Sold 
to me by Hitachi … I am the State. I got it all … It’s kind of a packaged deal. Not just energy, or 
transportation, or home, or health, or whatever. They’re actually ready to do what looks 
pretty much like a city council campaign. You could actually run for office like this … What are 
the political implications when you’ve actually sold off control over your streets; when you’ve 
offshored it to Silicon Valley or wherever it goes? Have you thought through the political 
implications of that? It may look smart, but how smart is that move? What happens if the App 
is on strike, or removes itself? How do you get the App back? Can you buy it; can you legislate 
it; can you code it yourself? You’re over a barrel sister! I’m a smart city but my brain is run in 
California. How is that supposed to work out? Look behind the beautiful façade!” 
Bruce Sterling, cyberpunk, at the 10th International FabLab Convention in Barcelona1 
 
1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Bruce Sterling’s quote vividly captures some of the knowledge politics involved in smart 
urbanism. Or at least, the concerns critics raise against the Smart City vision: the way urban 
processes are reduced to codified, inter-operable (and tradeable) information; whose 
processing through calculation and inference produces ostensibly authoritative knowledge 
about complex cities; and whose proprietary characteristics cedes power to ‘smart city’ 
service providers (Greenfield, 2012). At the same time, however, technological advances in 
sensors, data handling, internet platforms, ubiquitous computation, and ever more 
imaginative visualisation permits wider access to information about cities, and opens up the 
possibility for unprecedented citizen involvement in urban processes. 
 
Barcelona was an appropriate place for Bruce Sterling to make his remarks. He did so on a 
conference platform which later that day saw then-Mayor Xavier Trias commit Barcelona to 
                                                        
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYNaoMkY8qY&feature=youtu.be (posted 15/07/2014; accessed 
30/09/2016) 
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becoming a smart, self-sufficient city within 40 years (see later). Under Mayor Trias, the city 
government was working hard to promote Barcelona as a world-leading smart city, and with 
considerable success (Continente et al, 2016). A wide variety of smart city installations had 
been implemented; international smart city service providers were locating their business 
operations into a test-bed district; and an ecosystem of smaller developers and start-ups were 
innovating smart Apps and other tools.2 Work was underway to integrate this patchwork of 
smart city elements into what was called an “Operating System” (OS) for the city: the 
“essential hardware, software and data components that quietly sit in the background 
directing urban flows, providing shared languages towards interoperability across multiple 
infrastructures” (Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017: 1).  
 
Then, in 2015, city elections provided a moment for recent shifts in the urban political 
landscape. The new Mayor, Ada Colau, took office with a vision rooted in citizen mobilisations, 
commons and collaborative approaches to urban experimentation, and prototypes for direct 
democracy. Her new party, Barcelona en Comú [Catalan for Barcelona in Common] emerged 
from a kaleidoscope of innovative practices carried by the burst of activism by the 15-M 
movement over the period 2011-15, and which emerged in response to the political and 
economic crisis triggered by the 2008 financial crash. Barcelona en Comú won 11 out of 41 
seats, and operates within a minority government. Under this coalition, the smart city was no 
longer a priority. Technological sovereignty has taken its place within a broader agenda for 
more democratic urban developments. In the terms of the Introduction to this book, 
Barcelona has undergone a shift in political rationality: “particular ways of thinking about, 
calculating and responding to [urban] problems” (p.11). Propelled by changing realities in the 
city and the emergence of new protagonists brought forwards by the contradictions in those 
realities, contending political rationalities have had consequences for the design and 
implementation of digital knowledge producing techniques. 
 
In this chapter, we look to Barcelona as a case study in the knowledge politics of smart 
urbanism. Barcelona helps us explore an issue central to this book, which is how “the political 
processes through which knowledge configuring practices and strategies for representing the 
urban fabric are assembled and institutionalized” (Introduction chapter, p.3). What is 
fascinating in Barcelona, and we suspect other cities, is how digital projects can be disrupted, 
reconceived and reclaimed – or complemented and replaced by new digital projects – through 
urban politics that interact across elite and grassroots settings, and in ways that suggest more 
plural and hopeful possibilities.  
 
2: SMART URBANISM 
 
                                                        
2 See the listing of multiple smart cities project at the Ajuntament website smartcity.bcn.cat (accessed 18th 
October 2016) 
 4 
The smart city is not a new response to urban development, but the latest in a stream of 
initiatives over the last half century to incorporate information and communication 
technologies into processes for knowing and governing cities (Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017). 
Often, the promise of such radical technological changes is to rationalise urban sociotechnical 
transformations, and the implication is that it risks entrenching a ‘post-political’, technocratic 
approach to the city (Swyngedouw, 2009). Critical urban scholars see in smart city visions and 
experiments the interests of a rather narrow neo-liberal agenda focused upon technological 
fixes controlled by coalitions of corporate actors and city elites (Greenfield, 2013; Kitchen, 
2014). As such, cities cede authoritative urban knowledge production, which should be 
subject to democratic scrutiny, to commercially interested technology providers. In this line 
of argument, ownership and control of knowledge producing and urban governance 
technologies are key political issues (Feenberg, 1999). Yet, advocates argue that ceding 
authoritative urban knowledge production to private parties is a reasonable political 
arrangement if those commercially interested smart city service providers produce 
knowledge that improves urban performance for their public authority clients, and if citizens 
benefit from improved services and more efficient use of their tax contributions. In this 
controversy between advocates and critics of the smart city, knowledge politics emerges with 
regard to the ownership and control of the knowledge production apparatus, its credibility 
and its performance. 
 
Advocates and critics alike tend to see smart city technologies as largely impacting upon cities, 
like an external force of change, for good or ill. Sometimes there is recognition that smart 
technologies are shaped by global social and technological processes, such as neo-liberal 
ideology, public research into computation and Big Data, the rise of Silicon Valley, or 
normalising digital cultures. These social forces are usually deemed so pervasive or powerful 
that, from the perspective of an individual city, they appear as all-determining (Jordan, 2008). 
However, there remains relatively little consideration for the way in which digital technology 
developments may take shape in specific socio-material urban settings. Urban actors and 
historical social and material heritage exercising agency – which we will refer to as urban 
agencies – over digitally-enabled ways of conceiving, knowing about and intervening in urban 
development tend to be overlooked or downplayed.  
 
Indeed, grassroots initiatives have been developing alongside off-the-shelf packages for smart 
city services, for instance in the area of sensors and environmental information; a 
development which potentially opens uses of ICT for citizen-led urban governance (Tironi and 
Sanchez Criado, 2015; Gabrys, 2014). Arguably, more democratic control of smart city 
technologies, including the utilization of free and open software protocols, permits pluralistic 
values and assumptions to continually enter governance debates and deliberations (Kurban 
et al, 2017). Furthermore, whilst powerful market and ideological dynamics shape ICT 
developments into forms that centralise urban knowledge convenient to corporate and urban 
elites, the implementation of off-the-shelf packages requires adaptation to a particular city’s 
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characteristics (Kahn and Kellner, 2007). Global social forces are therefore always confronted 
with local dynamics, which therefore need to be taken into account to understand smart 
urbanism. Municipalities are also developing expertise in-house, and working with grassroots 
groups, local businesses and larger providers to develop bespoke services (Luque-Ayala and 
Marvin, 2015; Hajer and Dassen, 2014). Recognizing urban agencies in smart city 
developments highlights that a much more hybrid, less monolithic smart urbanism is 
emerging, each nevertheless involving an inescapable knowledge politics. 
 
Overlooking urban agencies in favour of focussing on global social and technological 
processes shaping smart technologies also obfuscates the agency of smart technologies’ 
materialities themselves – rather than their ownership and control – in the production of 
knowledge for urban governance. As this book’s introductory chapter argues: the production 
of knowledge is rooted not only in discourse but also in material epistemic technologies: 
material artifacts enacting and articulating certain ways of knowing the city. The realization 
of smart city’s promises relies upon the production, analysis and integration of big and varied 
data-sets, produced by a plethora of sensors (including static devices embedded in city 
infrastructures and mobile devices carried by citizens), and run by computers and servers 
whose calculations produce representations (ideally in real-time) about different aspects of 
city performance. Knowledge is produced through networked platforms: city-dash boards, 
Apps, control centres, and other devices that enable people to know what is going on in the 
city and who can intervene to adapt behaviour accordingly. These devices may afford 
different kinds of human participation: the devices enact people and other things in certain 
ways (Tironi, 2015). Some smart-enabled interventions are highly automated, such as the 
optimisation of traffic systems, or the triggering of actuators linked to, say, irrigation of parks. 
In other cases, human users are required to respond to signals, nudges or incentives issued 
by the smart city system, effectively acting automatically if human response involves little 
reflection. And then there are smart services that invite more active deliberation and decision 
by ‘smart citizens’, particularly when platforms are open to adaptation, but nevertheless 
within an invited arena with designed parameters for participation (Vanolo, 2016; Kurban et 
al., 2017).  
 
Knowledge emerging from smart technologies is not only political because this knowledge 
may play an active role in urban governance decision-making, but also because the process 
of knowledge creation inevitably involves making choices, an insight emerging from science 
and technology studies (STS; see Introduction chapter). Whilst there are distinct schools of 
thought, at its heart STS analyses how any ‘techno-scientific’ project intended to better 
understand and govern complex worlds, necessarily carries normative assumptions and 
values in its design and implementation (Jasanoff, 2004). The knowledge produced by a smart 
city project is constructed through the interaction of design choices, user practices, the 
platforms themselves and the agency of the material characteristics of the issue about which 
knowledge is being produced (Latour, 2005). In other words, knowledge production in smart 
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platforms is a political process, involving multi-scalar negotiation, agreement and dispute 
about the implementation of smart city technologies. This effectively determines what 
information is gathered, how knowledge is produced (as well as inevitable gaps and 
uncertainties) and interpreted, and then how these insights are represented as reliable 
knowledge for acting in the city (Matthewman, 2011).  
 
From this short review, the following three aspects of smart urbanism’s knowledge politics 
can be distilled: i) the critical role of urban agencies – or understanding smart urbanism as a 
situated, socio-material practice; ii) the agency of smart city technologies’ materiality as well 
as the ownership and control of these technologies, and: iii) the political rationalities, values 
and assumptions embodied in their design and use. We will use these insights as a lens on 
Barcelona as a smart city in order to better understand the interrelation between smart 
knowledge configuring practices and shifting political rationalities.  
 
3: BARCELONA: MOVING BEYOND THE SMART CITY? 
 
Barcelona is often presented internationally as a pioneer in modern urbanism. The Cerdà plan 
extended (and liberated) the city beyond its walls in the 1860s in a way that became symbolic 
for modernisation (Aibar and Bijker, 1987). Soon after the walls fell, the city fortress was 
demolished in order to create space for a Universal Exposition in 1888 (and what became the 
Ciutadella Park). The Exposition showcased urban redevelopments and a modern city to over 
2 million visitors. A second World’s Fair was held on Montjuïc in 1929. Developments for this 
exposition, conceived as a further motor for city development, similarly produced important 
monuments to modernisation. This ‘model’ evolved fitfully over the years - an international 
projection of the city based in modernising district developments – and found spectacular 
expression with the Olympic Games in 1992, and a less successful attempt with the Universal 
Forum of Cultures in 2004 (Degen and García, 2012). 
 
Implementation of the ‘Barcelona model’ (Ribera-Fumaz, 2017) always involved political 
controversy and social and economic struggle (Aibar and Bijker, 1987; McDonogh, 2011): 
between social classes, over space, in the priorities and directions for development, 
concerning rights to the city, contradictions between attracting inward investment and 
attending to neighbourhood needs, and, pertinent here, the selective use of technology and 
knowledge about the city. Confronting the models of Barcelona’s urban elite is a grassroots 
history of working class struggle, neighbourhood and nationalist politics, and social 
movements, all of which have understood their city quite differently. These contentious 
histories provide an important context for appreciating the arrival of the Smart City in 
Barcelona, and an aspiration for technological sovereignty. 
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3.1 The smart city vision 
 
The positioning of Barcelona amongst the vanguard of Smart Cities was attempted most 
explicitly and vigorously under the leadership of Mayor Trias (2011-15) (Continente et al, 
2016). Trias’s deputy mayor for Urban Habitat, Antoni Vives, and the department’s general 
director Vicente Gaullart set about articulating and implementing the vision. Prior to entering 
public office, Vives and Gaullart had been co-founders in 2001 of the Institute of Advanced 
Architecture of Catalonia (IAAC), dedicated to propel research and education about bringing 
new technologies into urban spaces. Whilst drawing upon visionary ideas cultivated at IAAC, 
these smart city leaders capitalized on projects and skills already present in Barcelona. In 
doing so, they articulated and repackaged initiatives already underway in the city, attempting 
to re-orientate the city to their vision.  
 
In terms of operations and strategies already present in the area, the city had in 1990 created 
the Municipal Institute for Information Technology (IMI – Institut Municipal d’Informàtica) as 
an independent municipal body providing IT services. Fibre-optic cable began weaving 
through the city from 1994, and the introduction of networked computing services promoted 
thereafter. In 2000, the previous city council had announced an ambitious plan to develop a 
Knowledge District in the Poblenou area. Informed by a second phase of regeneration 
planning after the Olympics, this relatively run-down and poorly-served district was 
earmarked for residential, educational and commercial developments. The objective was to 
turn it into an attractive site for international investment in a knowledge economy that would 
attract a high-skill workforce to the city, including the ICT sector (Leon, 2008). The district was 
called 22@ and a municipal company, also called 22@, was created to market and manage 
the real estate and infrastructure projects involved. International property developers and 
investment firms began investing in the buildings rising above the old factories, mechanics 
and artists workshops, and housing.3 The Torre Llacuna towerbuilding iconic for 22@ was 
completed in 2003. The nearby Media-ICT building won the World Building of the Year award 
in 2011 (March and Ribera-Fumaz, 2014: 5; Continente et al, 2014). Local universities opened 
campuses in the district. Barcelona Activa, the economic development agency of the city 
council, turned its attention to high-tech start-ups and entrepreneurs, and opened offices and 
provided incubation space in the Media-ICT building.  
 
Under mayor Trias, Barcelona committed to Open Data policy in 2011, and began providing 
citizens and businesses with access to some of the information gathered by the council about 
the city. The city was selected as the Mobile World Capital by GSMA in 2011, and hence 
hosted future Mobile World congress events as well as the Smart City Expo since the same 
year. These events brought business executives and urban policy-makers to the city. Moves 
                                                        
3 Whose neglect had provided space for artists and creative collectives now being displaced by the room being 
made for knowledge industry (Martí-Costa and Pradel I Miquel, 2012). A local campaign to resist and moderate 
22@ to local needs had limited success. 
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were made to attract international smart city technology firms to locate their development 
operations in 22@. Strategic agreements were announced, for example, with Cisco, IBM, 
Schneider-Telvent, Telefónica, GDF Suez and others. Indeed, as the smart city vision 
developed, so 22@ became marketed as a campus for smart city developments (March and 
Ribera-Fumaz, 2014; Charnock et al, 2014). 
 
Smart systems were in place, or being established, to monitor and control traffic, energy, 
water use in parks, waste collection services, social services, care for the elderly, public 
transportation, and so forth (Bakici et al, 2013; Kuyper, 2016). IMI and others were developing 
software systems for managing the accumulation of thousands of diverse of sensors (e.g. the 
Sentilo open-software platform). Leaders invited, and incentivized, technology developers to 
embed themselves in the city and conduct smart urban experiments. Local entrepreneurs and 
start-ups were encouraged to make use of the data and platforms that were emerging, and 
to participate in smart city projects (Capdevila and Zarlenga, 2015). The city announced 
ambitions to create a city Operating System that would interconnect information from across 
the multiplying sensor networks and data gathering platforms in different city administration 
departments, and hence boost the ability of city authorities to observe and manage their 
intelligent city in real time.  
 
Intriguingly, Vives announced, and began implementing, a plan to open ten public digital 
fabrication workshops in each of the ten districts of Barcelona as part of the smart city vision. 
Inspired by a ‘FabLab’ model originating at MIT (and which IAAC had pioneered on its 
premises since 2006), these ‘Ateneus de Fabricació Digital’ were equipped with a suite of 
digital design and fabrication technologies that would allow citizens to train and experiment 
in the prototyping of physical objects, and to share designs, knowledge and collaborate 
digitally with similar workshops globally (Smith, 2015). A network of neighbourhood Ateneus 
was envisaged as part of the public infrastructure for the 21st century smart city. These 
production facilities were envisaged as enabling Barcelona to become more materially self-
sufficient whilst competing in a more sustainable world: sustainable design knowledge will be 
traded globally, but physical goods were made (and remanufactured) in local circular 
economies (Diez, 2012). At the 10th FabLab convention held in Barcelona in 2014, Mayor Trias 
committed his city to making over half the goods its consumed locally within 40 years (the 
smart, self-sufficient city; see Guallart, 2014).  
 
The ambition with the extensive portfolio of smart initiatives was to simultaneously attract 
and finance industrial development, such that Barcelona would become a global hub for the 
development of (exportable) smart city services, whilst modernizing the city itself for a smart 
citizenship – a citizenship comfortable using technology applications, responding to the data 
that they willingly contribute towards smart city services, but not necessarily demanding 
other rights and responsibilities. By July 2015, Fortune magazine was writing how Barcelona 
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was ‘the most wired city in the world’ (Walt, 2015). The city regularly featured at the top of 
global rankings for smart cities and innovative cities. 
 
And yet, throughout these developments, citizens of Barcelona were positioned as relatively 
passive beneficiaries of smart city developments: as users of the services provided, 
beneficiaries of the visionary developments, workers in the new sectors; but, apart from the 
tech entrepreneurs, citizens actively involved in initiating and shaping grassroots ‘smart’ 
developments were overlooked. Meanwhile, myriad contracts were struck with businesses to 
develop the technologies and services, and demonstration funds from the European 
Commission and elsewhere were used to help embed smart-devices in urban development. 
As Fortune magazine observed, “Discreet and largely unannounced, the changes in Barcelona 
have slipped by even observant residents … Yet the stealthy transformation is profound and 
potentially so sweeping that no one is sure where it will lead” (Walt, 2015). In fact, 
announcements were made, and marketed very professionally, but appeared to be addressed 
as much, if not more, to international audiences relevant to Barcelona’s global position, than 
to local users of the new services. 
 
3.2 Grassroots digital urbanism 
 
Whilst the smart city was being embedded in bus-stops, lamp posts, refuse bins, mobility 
systems, and machine-readable databases, and whose sensors and actuators were being 
interconnected through a developing Operating System, another smart Barcelona was 
becoming increasingly vocal and active. The economic crisis signalled by the financial collapse 
of 2008, and whose political consequences overwhelmed Trias’s predecessor, was now 
troubling his administration in turn. 
 
Construction, housebuilding, and urban developments had fuelled much of the economic 
growth in Spain from the 1990s, until the bubble burst in 2008 (García, 2010). The exposure 
of Spain to the global financial crisis was exacerbated by an associated implosion of its 
property market. Many families were left unable to meet mortgage repayments and, by 2012, 
one household was being evicted every 15 minutes; even though there was little social 
support for the homeless, and with 3.4 million homes vacant (Romanos, 2013). The Platform 
of Mortgage Victims (PAH, La Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca, formed in 2009) 
articulated moral outrage at this situation and mobilised it into effective practical action. In 
doing so, it became a citizen mobilisation significant beyond housing, in Barcelona and 
hundreds of other cities, and that joined a confluence of actions in energy, mobility, culture, 
urbanism, and communications arising from 15-M in 2011. In the streets, and through varied 
actions, a broader vision for democracy and urban governance began to be articulated that 
was quite different to Trias’ smart urbanism, and political programmes to put the broader 
vision into effect were developed (Gutiérrez, 2017; Gonick, 2016).  
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PAH built a power base that enabled it to renegotiate housing contracts and debt repayments 
on behalf of individual members. PAH did this by reframing evictions as a systemic and 
institutional issue rather than an individual failing, and coordinated more conventional 
campaigning activities for housing reforms alongside its practical help and solidarity for 
individual households (De Weerdt and Garcia, 2016). Digital tools helped in the organisation 
and communication of this activity at scale: making decisions, operating transparently, 
sharing information, eviction alerts, and experience about legal and banking matters, and 
networking between neighbourhood associations, especially when the campaign moved 
rapidly and began to operate nationally. 
 
Grassroots groups were developing initiatives in what was becoming known widely as the 
solidarity economy: loosely affiliated systems of cooperative production and consumption 
initiatives in areas as diverse as food, mobility, energy, culture, housing, and politics. A variety 
of digital tools and platforms were being developed by activist coders and grassroots groups 
for assisting and coordinating solidarity and cooperative economic activity. Digital social 
innovations helped advance offline activities in citizen urbanism. Included in movement 
thinking was a rejection of neo-liberal models of globally competitive, marketised cities and, 
in the context of urbanism, new ways of thinking and doing urban practices dedicated to 
prototyping open neighbourhood developments, and through this the production of common 
goods and services (Estalella et al, 2013). 
 
Experimental platforms were being built, typically involving an ethic of openness and 
collaboration inspired by free software and free culture movements, for connecting local 
producers to consumers, promoting ethical and solidarity exchanges, and anticipating 
different kinds of digitally-enabled currency, peer-production and collaborative consumption. 
Digital citizen deliberation techniques were emerging from the multitude of groups, 
networks, platforms and associations throughout Spain (2011-13) (Gutiérrez, 2017; Monterde 
et al, 2015). Activists in Barcelona worked in collaboration with activists in Madrid, A Coruña, 
Sevilla, and other cities in Spain. At the same time as developing tools, there were debates 
and discussions about the conceptual frameworks for organising this activity, and for doing 
so strategically. Threading together the kaleidoscope of initiatives were commitments to 
direct democracy, transparency and citizen-centred forms of governance, and borne of 
indignation towards an incumbent system deemed (in the context of revelations of political 
and business corruption emerging after the economic crisis) to be inept, corrupt, closed, and 
self-serving (Gutiérrez, 2017). 
 
The new visions for direct democratic urban practice were inspired by affinities between 
concepts coming from autonomist and feminist movements, free culture movements, and, 
significantly, the free software movement. A hacker ethic towards decentralised forms of 
online coordination, collaboration and peer production, and commitment to transparent and 
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democratic rights in technology, informed the conceptual thinking. If the smart city vision 
subsumed (and shaped) digital affordances within a logic of markets, service provision and 
neo-liberal ideas about urban efficiency, then here, activists were shaping digital affordances 
and applying them within a quite different framework. A generation accustomed to accessible 
digital technology speeding up their ability to communicate and organise, took this practice 
in a seemingly more directly democratic direction. Social media tools were adapted into 
‘technopolitical media’ for: collecting ideas; discussing them, opposing them and modifying 
them; voting and taking decisions; and communicating this through content creation using 
new media (Kurban et al, 2017). These tools proved promising and helpful, and took the 
concept of digital cities in quite different directions compared to the closed development of 
dashboards and platforms by technology corporations, and in which data is centralised, 
released conditionally, and wraps a veneer of transparency and controlled participation 
around existing urban institutions. Moving beyond these elite forms of e-government, 
technopolitical activists were working at canvassing citizen knowledge to build more direct 
decision-making, and citizen-led urban governance, and connecting citizens as protagonists 
in new relations with representative democratic institutions (Kurban et al, 2017). These digital 
platforms relied upon voluntary contributions of knowledge and skill, and crowdsourced 
funds. The code for tools developed originally to organise 15-M occupations, and for 
coordinating and debating developments in initiatives and movements thereafter, was shared 
through GitHub, such as the Consul free software. Early platforms like Propongo, and tools 
used by Partido X and Podemos, went on to underpin city platforms like Decide.es, and that 
are now being used by a variety of city administrations. 
 
All this was happening at the same time as the international promotion of Barcelona as a 
smart city. Activists saw two different cities: the elite Barcelona using smart city as a brand in 
its neo-liberal competition for capital – a city rendered into an efficient and convivial location 
for mass tourism and the global knowledge economy; and the Barcelona of neighbourhood 
activism, struggling to build from below what they considered to be a more democratic 
urbanism capable of addressing issues and problems considered inherent to the neo-liberal 
model. Tellingly, when the city council moved to open one of its first Ateneus de Fabricació 
Digital in the disadvantaged neighbourhood of Ciutat Meridiana in 2013, for example, the 
building they chose was already being used by a community food bank. Neighbours occupied 
the building in protest: they needed food and local solidarity, not 3D printers and design 
platforms. A resolution was found in re-housing the food bank and committing the Ateneu to 
training young people into work. The event illustrated a clash between the citizens envisaged 
by the Council in the future smart city with the pressing realities confronting citizens today 
(Smith, 2015). 
 
The example of decision-making platforms illustrates how various technopolitical actors were 
helping connect traditional forms of urban activism to new scales and forms of agenda-
setting, decision-making and mobilisation amongst citizens, and in so doing create new ways 
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of knowing and acting in the city. Mistakes, lessons, and knowledge production could proceed 
rapidly: about local activities, discussed, shared, reframed, aggregated with knowledge about 
similar initiatives elsewhere, and mobilised and organised for a more participatory, commons-
based and democratic kind of urbanism. Platforms provided new ways of engaging and 
connecting with more traditional forms of neighbour mobilisation. Activist were practising an 
incipient urban governance operating beneath and around existing institutions. Ultimately, 
however, some activists argued that if democratic technopolitics – the subversive use of 
technologies combined with legal and political tools – was to realise its potential in less 
precarious and more influential ways, an engagement with city institutions was necessary 
(Kurban et al., 2017). New parties like Podemos and Barcelona en Comú were formed from 
amongst activist networks as a strategy to enter and transform urban institutions (Eizaguirre 
and Pradel-Miquel, 2017).  
 
3.3 Technological sovereignty 
 
Democratic technopolitics was instrumental to the development of the new political parties 
that emerged from the 15-M social movements, including Podemos and Barcelona en Comú. 
Platforms were used to select candidates, publish financial information, set agendas, debate 
issues, communicate across meetings, decentralise campaigns to local groups, communicate 
with allied groups, networks and movements, and keep leaderships accountable to the 
horizontal networks that constituted their power base. Working in this way in 2015 city 
elections (Eizaguirre and Pradel-Miquel, 2017), Barcelona en Comú won enough votes to form 
a minority city government in partnership with other parties. Ada Colau, who had been a 
spokesperson for PAH, became Mayor. 
 
 Smart urbanism was not a priority compared to issues of housing, corruption, mass tourism, 
rights to the city, and aspirations for more commons-based economic activity and the 
remunicipalisation of core city services. Nevertheless, digital tools for public deliberation 
were emblematic of aspirations to create a new way for city politics. Moreover, the 
underlying vision for approaching these and other issues, seeking commons-based 
developments through citizen participation, were informed by ideas in free culture and 
commons-based urbanism similar to those inspiring democratic technopolitics. The smart city 
of the previous administration came to be reconsidered through a technopolitical lens, and 
digital urbanism in the city reoriented to a policy of technological sovereignty. Another strand 
to the technological sovereignty vision was mounting concern about the concentration of 
data in the hands of a handful of poorly regulated technology platform providers. Wikileaks 
revelations of state interest in this data similarly heightened concern about data and control 
over technology. Questions of data sovereignty and the capacity of citizen rights in basic 
information utilities were a topic moving beyond digital activism and into the public eye. 
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It took time to develop a digital strategy aligned to the democratic urban commons towards 
which the new city government aspired. Studies were commissioned and people appointed, 
including Francesca Bria as Chief Technology and Digital Innovation Officer, and who had a 
background in European digital projects aligned to technopolitical aspirations. Some of these 
projects, such as the D-CENT citizen deliberation platform, involved technopolitics activists 
based in Barcelona. The new Digital City Plan for 2017-2020 was published in October 2016. 
The leitmotif for the new plan was to move beyond the smart city and transition to 
technological sovereignty. Transparent digital technologies accountable to citizens were 
sought in the strategy, and that would contribute to urbanism that is commons-based, 
circular and creative (Barcelona City Council, 2016). Council policy is to develop a data 
commons, and to use this transparently through open source digital practices. It involves a 
redirection and redevelopment of the Operating System projects inherited from the previous 
administration. 
 
Emblematic projects have been established to implement the plan. Decidim.Barcelona has 
taken the technopolitics platforms for activist agenda-setting and decision-making, and 
developed these into a platform for citizen participation in urban policy and development.4 
In keeping with the activist ethos, not only is the platform open source, but so too is the 
process for reflecting upon its operation and future development through a ‘meta-lab’ of 
open debate. This includes discussion about connecting online deliberation with face-to-face 
discussion and activity: bringing social weight to online information through the involvement 
of urban groups and the organisation of neighbourhood meetings. Decidim benefitted from 
earlier work in the D-CENT European Commission project for developing direct democracy 
platforms and which involved Francesca Bria, then at Nesta, and other European partners. A 
further European project, called DECODE, involves the city council digital team working with 
European partners in the development of blockchain techniques aimed at giving citizens 
greater control over their digital identity, with tools to help them set the way their data is 
shared for public good purposes (cf corporate models of data extraction). Meanwhile, 
Decidim has been used to open up council processes to citizen participation, in the form of 
canvassing ideas and suggestions, coordinating comment and discussion, and voting on 
decisions, and which have input to planning documents, local initiatives, budgeting, and other 
areas. It is currently being used in a process to rethink the development of the 22@ district 
and open it to citizen proposals. The aspiration is for new ways for people to participate in 
knowing and shaping the city: not as data points, but as co-designers.  
 
Inserting these new design requirements into contracting arrangements with digital service 
providers has been part of the technological sovereignty policy. The reform of public 
purchasing policy to require open software and see data ethics encoded into techniques that 
                                                        
4 The code and services offered by Barcelona.Decidim, and the Decide platforms from which it forked, are being 
taken up by other cities around the world and competing against commercial citizen participation services.. 
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give each citizen rights over their data is a key measure, although it is as of yet unclear what 
kinds of changes these requirements will induce. It is not always possible to renegotiate 
arrangements to the proprietary contracts struck by the previous administration, and so not 
all digital governance is retrospectively sovereign to council and citizens. Increasing diversity 
amongst vendors and providers, and not being reliant upon a limited number of packages, is 
another way the city authorities are trying to assert sovereignty. The promotion and opening 
up to digital social innovation providers, for example, and taking policy cues from free culture 
approaches, involves city authorities inserting values and assumptions that differ from those 
of the previous regime into digital infrastructures and services. Digital methods are being 
applied to the issues central to Barcelona en Comú’s political vision, such as Big Data 
techniques for advancing socially inclusive housing and addressing illicit holiday lets, for 
example; or ensuring participation in the design of neighbourhood projects; or the 
commitment to transparency in public administration and politics.  
 
Such diversity and more hybrid arrangements work to shift political relations in digitally 
enabled knowledge about the city. But the technology sovereignty vision is nevertheless 
tempered by the necessity of remaining competitive in a global digital economy. The strategy 
is careful to go beyond the smart city, while not rejecting smart urbanism. The plan speaks to 
diversify the digital economy. Agreements and provisions are made to continue promoting 
Barcelona as an attractive investment location for technology firms. Barcelona Activa remains 
an important hub for entrepreneurship, but now includes a team dedicated to supporting the 
solidarity economy, and which helps groups pioneering digital social innovation in the city. 
The promotion of the city to capital continues with Smart City Expo and Mobile World 
Congress. There are policies for promoting skills and facilities for Industry 4.0, at the same 
time as support for a Makerdistrict and continued promotion of the Ateneus de Fabricació 
Digital. This raises interesting questions about the flexibility in which some knowledge 
producing activities can easily move into the technological sovereignty rationale with little 
apparent change in practices. Programmes and initiatives to enable active citizen involvement 
in digital commons can equally equip them to work in the digital economy. 
 
In all these changes in the political rationalities in relation to smart urbanism projects, it is 
important to remember that political leadership in the technology sovereignty strategy comes 
from a new political party borne of social movements, yet whose minority position in the 
council leaves it dependent upon agreements with other parties with differing ‘political 
rationalities’ (see the Introduction chapter). Moreover, the elected city council inherits city 
institutions and administrative bureaucracy and materialities (the Operating System, for 
example, and contracts already in place) shaped by historic layers of complex economic, social 
and political compromises not of their own making, and with which the digital strategy has to 
negotiate.  
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Not all urbanism is viewed through a digital lens, whether sovereign or smart. We write this 
chapter during the crisis in relations between Catalunya and the Spanish state, in which older 
forms of politics are dividing opinion and playing for advantage, and while Barcelona en Comù 
is a minority government that recently became even smaller after a recent fallout with one 
of its coalition partners. Highly charged contentions over sovereignty, democracy, and 
governance are at stake, and in which Barcelona’s future rests. 
 
4: COMPETING RATIONALITIES OF SMART CITY FUTURES 
The picture that emerges from our theoretical review and the example of Barcelona suggests 
more nuance is needed compared to the smart city solutionism of advocates and the 
troubling hegemony seen by critics. Smart city technologies do not land in cities as packages 
for installation or domination, but are actively shaped by specific urban situations that have 
histories and geographies; in which smart city initiatives negotiate complex institutional 
layers, and where digital initiatives are shaped and altered as much as digital imperatives 
shape those contexts.  
 
In Barcelona, we see two major, contesting political rationalities for digital urban 
development, each emerging from global discourses as well as Barcelona’s socio-material 
history and the specific life histories of key urban actors. Under mayor Trias, a smart city 
marketplace emerging from the corporate world was being promoted as an attempt to 
revitalise the competitiveness of the urban economy combined with programmes in which 
citizens were invited to train and experiment in the use of digital technologies. This rationality 
draws on Barcelona’s history as a showcase model for modern urbanism, which is tangible in 
Barcelona’s present-day socio-material urban fabric for example through its ongoing role as 
host of events such as the Smart City Expo, the material presence of the Cerdà plan in 
Barcelona’s street layout, and the legacy of earlier international urban events. It is also 
inspired by the personal experience of Antoni Vives and Vicente Gaullart, who had been co-
founders in 2001 of the IAAC, which was dedicated to advancing research and education on 
the use of new technologies in urban spaces. On the margins, and later under mayor Colau, 
this position was challenged by another political rationality which rejected neo-liberal models 
of globally competitive, marketized cities. Within the context of Barcelona’s housing crisis and 
drawing on the city’s history of social movements, this alternative was committed to direct 
democracy, transparency and citizen-centred forms of governance (Gutiérrez, 2017; 
Eizaguirre and Pradel, 2017). For its engagement with digital technologies, this movement 
drew on a hacker ethic, working with decentralised forms of online coordination and open 
source technologies, committed to transparent and democratic rights in technology.  
 
As part of these different political rationalities, different kinds of smart knowledge configuring 
technologies were created. An important point to take from this is that knowledge politics 
figures around a multiplicity of urban transformations, not a single transition process. Under 
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Trias, systems monitoring and controlling traffic, energy, water use in parks, waste collection 
services and more were put in place, and which were to be combined in a City Operating 
System under uncertain and complex arrangements of ownership and control between city 
authorities and companies supplying these technologies (Bakici et al., 2013; Kuyper, 2016). 
Such systems create knowledge based on the relatively passive participation of people and 
objects, whose behaviour is observed and measured using sensors and algorithms. These 
technologies were not introduced throughout the entire city, but in specific sectors, issues 
and/or districts amenable to prevailing investment and development opportunities. And, on 
the margins, there were resourceful spaces for activists and social entrepreneurs to develop 
alternative digital practices (including European Union programmes5), and which have also 
been infiltrating smart urbanism (Tironi and Sanchéz Criado, 2015; cf Marvin and Luque-
Ayala, 2017). These examples illustrate that urban agencies always need to be taken into 
account when trying to understand smart urbanism, also when the influence of neo-liberal 
ideology and international corporations is strong.  
 
Urban agencies are even more tangible in the case of smart knowledge configuring 
technologies that emerged among grassroots movements and later when Barcelona en Comù 
took minority control of the council. This episode shows that political rationalities and smart 
knowledge configuring technologies intersected and co-evolved, rather than one informing 
the other unidirectionally. Furthermore, the technologies that were created among 
grassroots movements at the time of the housing crisis are materially very different from the 
sensing and monitoring systems put in place under mayor Trias, and through their material 
difference facilitate different kinds of politics. Initially, grassroots movements appropriated 
open digital technologies for coordination and communication, based on principles of 
openness, accessibility, collaboration, decentralisation and sharing. These technologies 
helped to organize effective direct-action and to develop alternative political visions. Digital 
tools were also being developed to assist and coordinate solidarity and cooperative economic 
activity, for example connecting local producers to consumers. Changes in control of the city 
council in Barcelona then opened up space for grassroots approaches to move beyond 
prototyping, beginning to institutionalize. The city’s new digital strategy seeks technologies 
accountable to citizens, technologies which contribute to urbanism that is commons-based, 
circular and creative (Barcelona City Council, 2016). Decidim.Barcelona was developed, 
facilitating communication with established institutions on policy issues through a 
combination of online deliberation with face-to-face discussion (Kurban et al., 2016). 
Commitments to values of openness, transparency and participation materialize through the 
design of the platform: it is open-source, and there is space for reflection on the platform’s 
operation and future development. The creation of knowledge through Decidim.Barcelona 
and other platforms relies on the voluntary contributions of participants, who gain rather 
                                                        
5 See, for example, projects funded by the Collective Awareness Platforms for Sustainability and Social 
Innovation funded by the EU H2020 and FP7 programmes. https://capssi.eu/  
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than lose agency through their participation. The politics of knowledge here spills beyond a 
powerful agent introducing synoptic technologies that consolidate and extend the framings 
of dominant interests in urban development: digital technologies are opened up by dynamic 
and contradictory initiatives in the city, between different urban actors and developments, 
and smart technology becomes a strategy for redefining and redistributing power relations in 
urban development. Indeed, the Barcelona case shows that a plurality of political rationalities 
sought different expectations, values and assumptions in the design of digital services, which 
had to be negotiated in the creation and use of technologies in the city.   
 
5: CONCLUDING REMARKS: AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
It is important to be reflexive towards the analysis presented here. Our approach to 
understanding the knowledge politics of smart urbanism looked at how contending ideas and 
experiences in urbanism, linked to shifting political control in the city, shaped and were 
shaped by the development of digital apparatuses for knowing and acting in the city. Our own 
knowledge producing apparatus (our analytical framework and method) was productive for 
this purpose, but also overlooks important aspects of knowledge politics in smart urbanism. 
Our framing at the level of the city as a whole meant that the development consequences of 
fixing specific urban sub-systems through digital means was outside our focus. To what 
degree, for example, do investments in specific smart systems entrain a degree of path-
dependent developments that are difficult to dismantle or re-orientate, should that be 
desired or required? Recoding and retooling is no straightforward matter once sociotechnical 
configurations stabilise and institutionalise. Indeed, technologies have a tendency to 
hardwire social relations (Latour, 1991), and to act as a source of inertia or even path-
dependency over social relations seeking reforms (Kemp et al., 1998).  
 
Furthermore, it is clear that further in-depth analysis of the enactment of smart technologies, 
such as sensor networks, or city databases or digital fabrication facilities, are required to 
assess the material consequences of core functional logics in digital approaches, to 
understand whether and how the computational logic of these smart technologies is 
susceptible to changes in urban rationale, and which knowledges are bracketed out or 
included in re-aligned digital codifications.6 For example, knowledge about sustainability 
appears in reduced form in the smart city and technology sovereignty strategies in Barcelona. 
Notions of a self-sufficient city in the previous administration included an ecological 
modernist notion of how digital technologies will manage better urban metabolisms and close 
the loops of production and consumption through digital fabrication. Commitments to a 
                                                        
6 Such studies are underway in the research project from which this more general case study 
chapter comes – see Knowledge Politics of Smart Urbanism 
https://smartknowledgepolitics.com/  
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circular economy in the technology sovereignty strategy similarly see sustainability in terms 
of managing material flows and metabolisms. The material and social footprint of digital 
technologies themselves are glossed over. Any risks that digital infrastructures lock societies 
into accelerated cycles of upgrades and obsolescence, and whose material implications are 
troubling, are currently skirted around by digital policy. Knowledge that critiques ecological 
modernisation (York and Rosa, 2003), and that problematizes innovation as a solution to 
sustainable development, is not integral to the digital apparatus of knowledge production. 
Framings of urban sustainability that see socio-ecological relations as more than 
informational, and that propose less instrumental, more experiential and embodied ways of 
knowing and sensing, do not (yet) connect to digital framings and knowledge producing 
apparatus. There may be affinities as well as tensions: for example, can we conceive of digital 
technological sufficiency?7 
 
Indeed, with respect to inherent characteristics of approaching the urban through digital 
methods, one may ask: whoever is framing the urban issue towards which computation is 
addressed, are those groups nevertheless implementing a conception of the urban “as just 
assemblies of functions and processes and of human agency as no more than the enactment 
of routines and procedures that can be embedded in software”? (Kallinikos, 2011: 47). 
Through the use of digital technologies, wide-scale data can be brought together in 
unprecedented ways to inform (or even automate) decisive actions in real-time. Inserting 
smart city platforms into cities may consequently privilege those forms of computational 
codified knowledge, and gives greater affordance to functional and instrumental processes 
above other forms of knowing and acting in the city such as knowledge embodied through 
acts of neighbourliness, or culturally-informed ways of caring. Making a smart city operational 
would imply turning the actual city into a system: “urban processes, agents and stakeholders, 
in order to be part of analytics, insights and action, have to be inside the presumptions of the 
software system itself… Whilst incorporating diversity and the ability to develop relationships, 
the need for modularity, interoperability and transferability across systems – and cities – 
revokes specificity” (Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017: 15-16).  
On the other hand, data can be re-contextualised, and given greater social weight when 
framed and interpreted by the knowledges associated with plural experiences in the city 
(Tironi and Criado 2015). Open and transparent computation might help reveal implicit 
political and economic interests residing in hitherto unquestioned or unreflective notions of 
system operational efficiency, functional integration and purposes like international 
competitiveness. Hidden assumptions in the codifications of the software, and the loss of 
situated knowledge in the abstractions of the platforms, can be identified, rendered explicitly, 
and lead to corrections when code is open and programs run transparently. According to 
Kurban et al. (2016, 14) and the idea of technopolitics, “this dynamic and contentious process 
                                                        
7 Initiatives like the Open Source Circular Economy Days are one forum for exploring these 
possibilities. https://oscedays.org/  
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amongst various actors reconfigures political relations and power dynamics through 
conflicting appropriations as well as negotiations [of the technology].” This would imply that 
the areas of urban life where computation is applied, and the agendas they serve, can be 
democratically controlled. Indeed, a critical challenge for further research focussing on the 
workings of smart city systems in practice is to understand whether there are inherent 
characteristics of computational ways of knowing the city, how those play out in relation to 
non-computational ways of knowing and governing the city and whether digital projects can 
indeed be (re)conceived through urban politics that interact across elite and grassroots 
settings, creating more plural and hopeful possibilities as is being attempted in Barcelona.   
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